Episodic memory and self-reference via semantic autobiographical memory: insights from an fMRI study in younger and older adults by Sandrine Kalenzaga et al.
BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 13 January 2015
doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2014.00449
Episodic memory and self-reference via semantic
autobiographical memory: insights from an fMRI study in
younger and older adults
Sandrine Kalenzaga1,2,3†, Marco Sperduti1,2†, Adèle Anssens1,2, Penelope Martinelli1,2, Anne-Dominique
Devauchelle4, Thierry Gallarda2,5, Marion Delhommeau1,2, Stéphanie Lion4, Isabelle Amado2,5,
Marie-Odile Krebs2,5, Catherine Oppenheim2,4 and Pascale Piolino1,2,6*
1 Memory and Cognition Laboratory, Institut de Psychologie, Université Paris Descartes, Sorbonne Paris Cité, Boulogne-Billancourt, France
2 Center of Psychiatry and Neurosciences, INSERM UMR S894, Université Paris Descartes, Paris, France
3 Research Center in Cognition and Learning, UMR-CNRS 7295, Université de Poitiers, Poitiers, France
4 Department of Radiology, Centre Hospitalier Sainte-Anne, Université Paris Descartes, Sorbonne Paris Cité, Paris, France
5 Laboratory of Physiopathology of Psychiatric Diseases, Centre Hospitalier Sainte Anne, Paris, France
6 Institut Universitaire de France, France
Edited by:
Denise Manahan-Vaughan, Ruhr
University Bochum, Germany
Reviewed by:
Nikolai Axmacher, University of
Bonn, Germany
Christian Bellebaum, Ruhr
University Bochum, Germany
Boris Suchan, Ruhr University
Bochum, Germany
*Correspondence:
Pascale Piolino, Center of
Psychiatry and Neurosciences,
INSERM UMR S894, Université
Paris Descartes, 2 ter rue d’Alesia,
75014 Paris, France
e-mail: pascale.piolino@
parisdescartes.fr
†These authors have contributed
equally to this work.
Self-referential processing relies mainly on the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and
enhances memory encoding (i.e., Self-Reference Effect, SRE) as it improves the accuracy
and richness of remembering in both young and older adults. However, studies on age-
related changes in the neural correlates of the SRE on the subjective (i.e., autonoetic
consciousness) and the objective (i.e., source memory) qualitative features of episodic
memory are lacking. In the present fMRI study, we compared the effects of a self-related
(semantic autobiographical memory task) and a non self-related (general semantic memory
task) encoding condition on subsequent episodic memory retrieval. We investigated
encoding-related activity during each condition in two groups of 19 younger and 16 older
adults. Behaviorally, the SRE improved subjective memory performance in both groups but
objective memory only in young adults. At the neural level, a direct comparison between
self-related and non self-related conditions revealed that SRE mainly activated the cortical
midline system, especially the MPFC, in both groups. Additionally, in older adults and
regardless of the condition, greater activity was found in a fronto-parietal network. Overall,
correlations were noted between source memory performance and activity in the MPFC
(irrespective of age) and visual areas (mediated by age). Thus, the present findings expand
evidence of the role of the MPFC in self-referential processing in the context of source
memory benefit in both young and older adults using incidental encoding via semantic
autobiographical memory. However, our finding suggests that its role is less effective in
aging.
Keywords: self-reference effect, autobiographical memory, semantic memory, source memory, autonoetic con-
sciousness, medial prefrontal cortex, aging
INTRODUCTION
Healthy aging is associated with significant changes in episodic
memory, defined as the memory of specific episodes. In particular,
age-related deficits are pronounced for the qualitative aspects
of memories, namely the ability to relive a previous event in a
subjective way (i.e., autonoetic consciousness; Parkin and Walter,
1992; Perfect and Dasgupta, 1997; Clarys et al., 2002; Piolino et al.,
2006), and for contextual details, i.e., the ability to objectively
retrieve the encoding context (e.g., source memory; Spencer
and Raz, 1995 for reviews; Mitchell and Johnson, 2009). Older
adults have some difficulties in determining the context or exper-
imental encoding conditions of a previously encountered item
(Johnson et al., 1993 for a review). These age-related impairments
in source memory are particularly pronounced when encoding
contexts are very similar (Hashtroudi et al., 1989; Henkel et al.,
1998).
Source memory may rely on strategic processes (Fletcher and
Henson, 2001; Dobbins and Han, 2006) that are deficient in
older adults (Johnson et al., 1993) Thus, it has been proposed
that one way to reduce age-related deficits in source monitoring
is to give encoding instructions that favor the link between an
item and its context, for example by asking participants to decide
to what extent an item suits its encoding context (Hashtroudi
et al., 1994; Glisky et al., 2001; Naveh-Benjamin et al., 2007;
Glisky and Kong, 2008). The encoding strategy that has been
considered as the most effective for a few decades is self-referential
processing that consists of implicitly or explicitly linking the
information to be remembered with personal knowledge. There
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are mainly two self-reference encoding tasks: those requiring
participants to decide if a word to be remembered describes
their personality, and those requiring participants to retrieve an
autobiographical memory related to the word to be remembered.
The latter task has received much less attention to date (Klein
et al., 1989). The enhanced memory for self-referenced infor-
mation is known as the “Self-Reference Effect” (SRE; Rogers
et al., 1977; for a review, see Symons and Johnson, 1997). Self-
referential encoding (incidental or intentional) gives rise to a
mnemonic advantage since this kind of processing promotes
organization and elaboration of the material to be remembered
(Rogers et al., 1977; Klein and Kihlstrom, 1986). The SRE using
nouns is typically obtained with self-reference tasks promoting
autobiographical memory retrieval, while the SRE using adjec-
tives is found with tasks requiring participants to describe their
personality (for reviews, see Symons and Johnson, 1997; Klein,
2012).
Previous research in young adults has demonstrated that the
SRE improves both factual and contextual remembering, notably
source memory (Serbun et al., 2011; Leshikar and Duarte, 2012),
even with incidental encoding (Lalanne et al., 2013). Moreover,
self-referenced items are recollected more vividly than items
processed semantically (Dewhurst and Conway, 1994; Conway
et al., 2001; Fujita and Horiuchi, 2004) or with reference to
other people (Conway and Dewhurst, 1995). This phenomenon
has been mainly demonstrated using the Remember/Know/Guess
procedure in which participants are asked to state the nature
of their recollective experience during free recall or recognition
tasks (Tulving, 1985; Gardiner, 1988). This procedure makes it
possible to differentiate noetic consciousness (i.e., knowing that
an item occurs with no trace of specific detail) from autonoetic
consciousness (i.e., remembering that an item occurs with some
trace of specific details). Thus, self-reference encoding improves
the objective as well as the subjective characteristics of episodic
memory.
Due to the beneficial effect of self-referential processing on
both factual and contextual episodic memory features, it has
been applied in healthy aging as a strategy to reduce age-related
episodic memory impairments. Findings have indicated that the
SRE is still effective in aging, increasing the amount of items
retrieved similarly to young adults. Furthermore, it is robust
across encoding (e.g., incidental or intentional learning), and
testing tasks (e.g., recall or recognition), as well as across different
comparison conditions (e.g., semantic processing or processing
with respect to other people) (Mueller et al., 1986; Gutchess
et al., 2007, 2010; Glisky and Marquine, 2009; Kalenzaga et al.,
2012; Kalenzaga and Clarys, 2013; Lalanne et al., 2013). Moreover,
elderly people may benefit from self-reference encoding in the
enhancement of both memory for specific details and source
memory (Dulas et al., 2011; Hamami et al., 2011; Lalanne et al.,
2013). However, even if the SRE exhibited by older adults in
these studies is approximately the same size as that found in
younger adults, their overall level of performance still remains
lower.
Until now, few studies have addressed the question of the neu-
ral basis of the SRE on memory specificity in aging. Compared to
non-self processing, self-referential processing has been associated
with greater activity in cortical midline structures (CMS), a set
of brain regions located on the median wall of the frontal and
the parietal cortices, comprising the medial prefrontal cortex
(MPFC), the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and the posterior
cingulate cortex (PCC), (Craik et al., 1999; Kelley et al., 2002;
Kjaer et al., 2002; Fossati et al., 2003; Lou et al., 2004; Northoff
and Bermpohl, 2004; D’Argembeau et al., 2005; Heatherton et al.,
2006; Northoff et al., 2006; Gutchess et al., 2007; Raposo et al.,
2010; Morel et al., 2014). In particular, the MPFC seems to play a
pivotal role in self-referential processing (Northoff and Bermpohl,
2004; Denny et al., 2012; Martinelli et al., 2013c for reviews),
and the differential engagement of the MPFC during self-
referential encoding characterizes later remembered or forgotten
items (Macrae et al., 2004; Zhu et al., 2012; Morel et al., 2014).
Another study investigating the neural correlates of subsequent
recognition (pictures of common objects) and source memory
(background scenes) of information learned under either self or
non-self-reference encoding instructions reported that the MPFC,
and particularly BA10, contributes to the benefit of the SRE on
source memory (Leshikar and Duarte, 2012). Moreover, Philippi
et al. (2012) reported that a lesion of this structure abolished the
SRE, which corroborates the critical role of this region in this
effect.
Data from both neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies
suggest that normal aging is accompanied by a decline in the
functioning of the prefrontal cortex (for a review, see Park and
Gutchess, 2005). However, while aging is associated with struc-
tural (Raz, 2000) and functional (Cabeza et al., 1997; Cabeza,
2002; Logan et al., 2002; Gutchess et al., 2005; Reuter-Lorenz and
Lustig, 2005) changes in a number of lateral frontal areas, CMS,
including the MPFC, seem to be resilient in healthy older adults.
For example, both young and older adults similarly activated
the MPFC when thinking about the self, compared to thinking
about another person (Gutchess et al., 2007). This may explain
why self-representation is unaffected by aging (Terracciano et al.,
2010; Martinelli et al., 2013a), and why self-referential processing
is intact in healthy older adults (Gutchess et al., 2007, 2010;
Glisky and Marquine, 2009; Kalenzaga et al., 2012; Kalenzaga
and Clarys, 2013; Lalanne et al., 2013). Nevertheless, there might
be fundamental age differences in the regions linked to suc-
cessful encoding of self-referenced information with a reduc-
tion of specificity in the MPFC. Indeed, Gutchess et al. (2010)
established that older adults tend to show subsequent self-
referenced memory effects in prefrontal and parietal regions
which are related to subsequent forgetting effects in young
adults.
The vast majority of self-referential tasks require participants
to decide to what extent a set of personality traits describes
their personality, tapping one of the most abstract levels of
self-representation—conceptual self-knowledge (Conway, 2005;
Klein, 2010). Thus, neuroimaging studies on self-referential pro-
cessing have mostly studied the neural correlates of the SRE
involving such conceptual knowledge. To date, the study of
self-referential processing involving autobiographical memories
is missing. Moreover, given that healthy aging affects only the
episodic component of autobiographical memory, sparing the
semantic component (Levine et al., 2002; Piolino et al., 2002,
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2006, 2010; Martinelli et al., 2013a,b), the SRE via autobio-
graphical processing should be more effective if it is based on
semantic autobiographical memories (SAMs, i.e., generic per-
sonal memories, decontextualized extended or repeated events)
rather than episodic ones (i.e., unique events situated in time
and space). In a recent meta-analysis, Martinelli et al. (2013c)
reported that SAM is associated with the activation of a large
network including the MPFC, confirming the key role of this
structure in the retrieval of self-referential information indepen-
dently of the level of abstraction (see also Cabeza and St Jacques,
2007).
Although self-referential processing is an effective way of
improving episodic memory in healthy aging, studies are lacking
in this field. In particular, to the best of our knowledge, until now
no neuroimaging study has explored the relationship between
the SRE via SAM and qualitative aspects of episodic memory.
The present study used an “ecological” experimental situation to
assess the effect of an incidental self-referencing encoding elicited
by semantic autobiographical memory on subsequent delayed free
recall. Thus, the aim of the present study was to explore the
neural correlates of the SRE affecting the qualitative (i.e., auto-
noetic consciousness and source memory) aspects of episodic
memory traces in groups of young and older adults. To this
end, participants’ brain activity was measured by means of fMRI
while performing two incidental encoding tasks (i.e., self and
non-self related tasks) of verbal cues. We designed an original
self-referencing task to tap cue-based SAM retrieval (i.e., generic
personal memories).
According to the Self-Memory System’s hierarchy (Conway,
2005, 2009), SAM is the second most abstract system after self-
concepts. Thus, we can assume that the well-known generic
memories contained in this highly semanticized system should
improve the elaboration and organization of the material (Klein
and Loftus, 1988). Regarding non-self related processing, we
designed a general semantic task consisting of asking participants
to complete a sentence with a common word and to imagine the
described scene at the North Pole. Outside the scanner, we then
asked the participants to recollect each verbal cue seen in the
scanner (surprise free recall memory test).
At a behavioral level, we predicted that self-referencing should
improve both autonoetic consciousness and source memory in
young and older adults (Dulas et al., 2011; Hamami et al.,
2011), but that age-related decline would be observed, especially
for source memory. At a neural level, during the incidental
encoding of self-referenced cues via SAM retrieval (vs. general
semantic memory), we expected to replicate previous findings
on SAM, reporting activities in a widespread network encom-
passing CMS, especially the MPFC (Martinelli et al., 2013c).
Regarding the age effect, based on the literature focused on
SRE, we expected a relative preservation of the regions engaged
during self-referential processing with no difference between the
two groups in the CMS (Gutchess et al., 2007), but possibly
greater activation for older adults compared to young adults in
a number of extra CMS areas such as the frontal and parietal
cortex which would reflect a reduction of specificity in CMS
(Gutchess et al., 2010). Finally, we expected that the activity
during the SRE condition in several CMS regions would correlate
with subsequent episodic memory recall for both age groups. In
particular, based on previous results, we assumed that activity in
the MPFC should contribute to the source memory benefit for
self-referenced information in older adults, as previously found
in young adults (Leshikar and Duarte, 2012). Nevertheless, if
there is a loss of specificity in areas related to successful encod-
ing of self-referenced information in aging (i.e., reduction of
specificity in the MPFC), we hypothesized that additional age-
related correlations would be found between subsequent self-
referenced memory effects and extra CMS regions (Gutchess et al.,
2010).
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Nineteen healthy young (YA) (25–44 years old, mean
= 29.2 ± 5.69, 10 women) and 16 healthy older (OA) adults
(65–80 years old, mean = 68.31 ± 4.51, 9 women), all right-
handed (according to the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory;
Oldfield, 1971) and native French speakers, participated in
the study. All participants gave their informed written consent
as required by the local ethics committee (CPP Ile de France
3 n◦2687). All were unmedicated, living at home and in good
general health (clinically screened by a medical exam including
hypertension and cerebrovascular risk factors with the Fazekas
scale). Exclusion criteria included presence of a history of
alcohol or substance abuse, head trauma, major disease affecting
brain function, neuropsychiatric disorders (tested with the
Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview, Sheehan et al.,
1998), depression (tested with the Depression Scale, Yesavage
et al., 1983; 30 items, cut-off score >10; YA: 2.68 ± 2.6 and
OA: 3.62 ± 2.65), abnormal general cognitive functioning as
assessed by the Mattis scale (Mattis, 1976, cut-off score lower
than 136; YA: 142.44 ± 1.19 and OA: 140.06 ± 3.04), and
abnormal visual mental imagery ability (short form of Minnesota
Paper Form Board: Vandenberg and Kuse, 1978 (lower than 2
points over 5 points); YA: 4.47 ± 0.77 and OA: 4.12 ± 0.8).
Moreover, they all performed within their normal age range
for memory as assessed by the Grober and Buschke (1987) test
(sum of three total recalls, delayed total recall; YA: 47.94 ± 1.77,
16 ± 0.00 and OA: 45.50 ± 3.01, 15.50 ± 0.89). Finally, both
age groups were matched according to their verbal abilities and
crystallized intelligence as assessed by the Mill Hill test (Deltour,
1993; a multiple-choice synonym vocabulary test), (percentile
score; YA: 55.28 ± 17.27 and OA: 58.96 ± 25.69, t(33) = −0.34,
p = 0.73). For the purpose of the study, both age groups were
compared on a self-concept scale (French version, see Lalanne
et al., 2013; Martinelli et al., 2013a), adapted from the TSCS
(Fitts and Warren, 1996). Both age groups were matched for
valence (mean score; YA: 300.89± 27.84 and AO: 290.80± 18.36,
t(33) = 1.21, p = 0.25) and definite sense of the self (mean
score; YA: 31.94 ± 9.52 and OA: 33.13 ± 18.00, t(33) = −0.25,
p = 0.80).
PROCEDURE
General organization
This experiment included an incidental encoding task, divided
into two conditions, followed by a delayed free recall. Thus,
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it comprised three major phases. During the first phase (pre-
scanning interview), about 1 month before the scanning ses-
sion, participants were tested for exclusion and inclusion criteria,
they underwent a medical examination, a neuropsychological
assessment and completed the Taste and Interest Questionnaire
(TIQ) that was employed to create personal verbal cues used
in the scanning session. In the second phase (scanning session),
participants were trained for the experimental task outside the
scanner, then executed the task in the scanner. Finally, in the
third phase (memory recall) about 20 min after the end of the
scanning session, participants were asked to recall outside the
scanner as many verbal cues seen during the scanning session as
they could.
Pre-scanning interview
During the pre-scanning interview, exclusion and inclusion crite-
ria were verified by means of a clinical exam and psychometric
tests, followed by neuropsychological tests and the TIQ. The
aim of this questionnaire (Sperduti et al., 2013; Martinelli et al.,
2013b) was to collect information in order to create personalized
cues for each participant without directly asking them to describe
past memories to avoid re-encoding of memories (Viard et al.,
2007; Addis et al., 2011). Participants were informed that the
purpose of the questionnaire was to obtain a description of
their personality thanks to information about their principal life
interests excluding the last 5 years. Participants had no prior
knowledge of the aim of the fMRI task, preventing the possibility
of searching for memories linked to their tastes and interests
between the two sessions. The questionnaire consisted of a list
of 220 interests including leisure, food, drink, sport, transport,
residence, holidays, jobs, and studies. For each item (e.g., Chinese
food), participants had to answer whether it was personally per-
tinent or not, rated by 1 and 0 respectively. When an item was
pertinent, they had to rate how important (from 0 to 10) and
frequent (Frequent/Rare) the activity or interest had been in their
life. An activity or interest was used as a cue for SAM retrieval if
it was pertinent, important (>5), and frequent (e.g., chess club).
Twenty-four personalized cues were created for each subject with
the following structure: “a habit of your past linked to. . .”.
Scanning session
Participants were first invited to take part in a training session
before the fMRI scanning. They received detailed explanations
about the nature of the tasks and participated in a brief simulation
of the experiment on a laptop. Two conditions were explained
to the subjects: a self-referential condition through SAM retrieval
(self condition) and a control non-self condition through general
semantic scene imagery (imagery condition). No mention was
made about subsequent recall.
For the self-referential condition, participants were instructed
to mentally recall SAMs elicited by the cues under the scan.
SAMs were defined as generic memories of a repeated event that
occurred several times in the past, a regular activity that used to
occur at a routine time and place or a memory of an extended
event that could describe a summary of events over several days,
weeks, or months without a precise moment in time (e.g., “a
habit of your past about tennis”). They were instructed to search
and then recall each SAM (i.e., mental images of generic personal
events).
The control non-self condition consisted of a sentence comple-
tion task (e.g., “the teacher teaches. . .”) based on the Beauregard
verbal automatism test (Beauregard, 1971), which consists in
completing familiar phrases, idiomatic expressions, and proverbs.
The subjects were instructed to first complete the sentence with
the first word that came to mind (e.g., “lessons”) and then to
imagine the scene described in the sentence in a peculiar non-self
context, the North Pole. This scenario was used due to the non-
personal character of the North Pole since we wanted to avoid
any reference to autobiographical memory. Thus, participants
were explicitly instructed to imagine the scenes with no reference
to their personal life. The design of such a control condition
aimed at controlling processes involved in the SAM retrieval task
but not related to the self: encoding of new information, access
to general semantic knowledge, scene construction and mental
imagery. Moreover, for both conditions, participants were asked
to press a button as soon as they gained access to the generic
personal memory (SAM retrieval) or had completed the sentence
and begun to visualize the imagined scene in the context of the
North Pole. After instructions, participants were trained on three
trials for each condition with the experimenter giving feedback
concerning the pertinence of each response. The cues used for
the trials were different from those used during the scanning
session.
During scanning, cues were visually presented in white font
on a black background projected on a screen viewed by means
of a mirror incorporated into the head coil. E-Prime software
(Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA, USA) in com-
bination with the Integrated Functional Imaging System (IFIS)
was used for the presentation and timing of stimuli and collec-
tion of responses. Responses were made on an MR-compatible
two-button box.
Participants completed four functional scans, each lasting
5 min and 20 s, in a single session. Each functional scan was
composed of 12 items (6 self and 6 imagery) presented in a
randomized order within mini-blocks of three items of the same
condition. Each trial lasted 27 s with the following time-course:
the cue was presented for 5 s, followed by a white cross at the
center of the screen for 19 s, then the cross turned red for 3 s
informing the participants of the end of the present trial and the
upcoming of the next one.
Recall session
After the scanning session, there was a 20-min retention interval
during which participants had time to dress, to rest and go to
the debriefing room. They were then invited to freely recall all
the verbal cues seen in the scanner during the fMRI session and
to indicate, for each cue, the nature of recollection and spe-
cific contextual information. Participants were instructed about
the differences between remembering, knowing and guessing
(Tulving, 1985; Gardiner, 1988; Mäntylä, 1993). A Remember
response meant that cues’ recall was accompanied by the ability
to mentally travel back in time and re-experience something
about its presentation in the scanner, i.e., some aspects of the
original experience such as seeing the cue on the screen in
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the scanner. Participants were required to give either a Know
response if retrieval was achieved without any such recollec-
tion, or a Guess response if retrieval was doubtful. This latter
alternative was provided in order to ensure that the Remem-
ber or Know responses did not contain any degree of uncer-
tainty. The standard instructions were provided for all three
categories of responses and were very carefully explained to the
participants until each kind of response was fully understood.
Participants were asked to repeat the instructions to make sure
they had understood the nature of the task. Only the Remem-
ber responses that reflected the correct cues were taken into
account.
In order to assess source memory, participants were instructed
to indicate in detail the encoding context of each verbal cue
recalled, i.e., self or non-self condition (e.g., “I saw a sentence
about tennis, it was about myself, I pressed the button and
remembered my habits about tennis” or “I completed the sentence
the teacher teaches with the word lessons, I pressed the button
and imagined something about it in the North Pole”). Only the
responses that accurately reflected the encoding condition were
taken into account (e.g., the condition was the right one, the
participant had effectively pressed the button indicating SAM
retrieval or sentence completion for the cue). We also asked
in which functional runs the cue had been presented (1–4).
However, this information was not used in subsequent analyses
because there was a floor effect in the older group.
Finally, there was a debriefing during which participants were
asked to recall again each SAM retrieved during the scanning
session in order to check that those memories met the criterion of
generic memories (i.e., repeated events that occurred several times
in the past without a precise moment in time: “I remembered
my tennis lessons when I was in high school, I saw myself doing
the trip with my best friend to go to Roland Garros and have
fun together”). They were also asked to recall each scene again
in order to check for non-self reference (“I imagined a class
in an igloo with the teacher and students all bundled up in
snowsuits. They sat writing their lessons with mittens”). The
subsequent analyses were performed only on cues that met these
criteria and for which the participants had pressed the button
in the scan indicating the treatment of the cue (i.e., presence
of generic memory retrieval or sentence completion and scene
imagery).
For each experimental condition, we assessed the participants’
memory performance by computing two scores: the percentage of
correctly recollected items (CRI) and the percentage of correctly
recalled sources (CRS) as a function of the total number of correct
trials by condition (i.e., the number of trials (SAM or scene
imagery) for which the participant had pressed the button under
the scan, and that met the criterion at debriefing, max. 24).
The percentage of self-referenced CRI and CRS informed
us about the participant’s capacity to benefit from the SRE on
autonoetic consciousness and source memory, respectively.
fMRI METHOD
fMRI data acquisition
All data were acquired with a 3 T scanner (Discovery MR 750,
General Electric Healthcare, Little Chalfont, United Kingdom).
The anatomical scan used an inversion recovery 3-D T1-weighted
gradient-echo sequence images (TE = 4.3 ms, TR = 11.2 ms, TI =
400 ms, matrix = 384× 384, slice thickness = 1.2 mm). Functional
images were acquired using a gradient echo planar (EPI) sequence
(TE = 30 ms, TR = 2000 ms, flip angle = 90◦, FOV = 260 ×
260, matrix = 64 × 64, slice thickness = 3 mm, 42 contiguous
sections, in plane resolution 4.06 mm). The first four volumes of
each functional run were discarded in order to allow longitudinal
magnetization to approach equilibrium.
Pre-processing of fMRI data
All data were processed using SPM5 software (Statistical Para-
metric Mapping 5, Welcome Dept. Cognitive Neurology, UK1).
Standard pre-processing procedures were applied to MRI data.
EPI volumes were corrected for slice timing, realigned to the first
image, co-registered with the high-resolution T1-weighted image
and normalized into the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)
template. Finally, the normalized EPI volumes were smoothed
using an isotropic Gaussian kernel filter of 5 mm full-width half-
maximum.
Statistical analysis of fMRI data
Only cerebral activity for responses meeting criteria for the self
and imagery conditions were used for the subsequent analyses. A
trial was considered as a hit if (1) the participant had pressed the
button during the trial (indicating retrieval) and (2) the descrip-
tion of the memory recalled in the scanner during the debriefing
met the criterion for SAM or the description of scene imagery
in the scanner during the debriefing met the criterion for non-
self reference. Memory retrieval was modeled by convolving the
time period between cue presentation and subjects’ response with
the hemodynamic response function (HRF). For each subject, the
General Linear Model was used to estimate the parameters of
interest. Parameters of movement were also included in the model
as regressors of no interest.
Whole brain t-tests were computed to estimate the contrast of
interest for each subject: self vs. rest, and imagery vs. rest.
Individual contrasts were entered in a second level analysis
using a 2 groups (young-old)× 2 conditions (self-imagery) facto-
rial design. A corrected (FWE) cluster level threshold of p < 0.05
was used (voxel-wise threshold was set at p< 0.001 uncorrected).
Regression analyses
We employed the multiple regressions model in SPM to test
the link between brain activations and behavioral performance.
We entered in the model the contrast between the self and
the imagery condition for each subject and the CRI and CRS
scores. To improve statistical power we ran a first analysis on the
whole group of subjects (young and older). The threshold was
set at p < 0.001 uncorrected at voxel level, and reported results
survived small volume correction (SVC) at p(FDR) <0.05. SVC
correction was used since we looked for an effect only in areas
showing either a main effect of condition or a main effect of
group.
1www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm
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FIGURE 1 | Mean percentages (and standard deviations) of correctly
recollected items (CRI) by group and encoding condition (effect of
condition, ***p < 0.001, Bonferroni correction).
We then extracted signal change in the region showing a cor-
relation with MarsBar (Brett et al., 2002) for each subject, and ran
mediation analysis using partial correlation with STATISTICA7©
to investigate the effect of age on the link between brain activation
and memory performances.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
According to the debriefing and the responses in the scan-
ner, both young and older participants showed a similar high
percentage of analyzable trials (self condition, for YA: mean
91.74% ± 1.08, OA: mean 86.71% ± 1.65, t(33) = 1.62, p = 0.11;
imagery condition, for YA: mean 92.46% ± 0.06, OA: mean
87.89 ± 0.08, t(33) = 1.81, p = 0.08) and a similar rapid
response time for both conditions after time presentation of
cue, i.e., 5 s (self, for YA: mean 2.27 s ± 1.08, OA: mean
2.93 s ± 1.65, t(33) = −1.40, p = 0.17; imagery, for YA:
mean 2.0 s ± 1.07, OA: mean 2.31 ± 1.27, t(33) = −0.77,
p = 0.44).
We compared the percentages of CRI and CRS in two mixed
ANOVAs with groups (YA vs. OA) as a between-groups factor and
encoding conditions (self vs. imagery) as a within-subjects factor.
CRI
Figure 1 shows the percentages of CRI by group and encoding
condition.
The analysis revealed no effect of group, F(1,33) = 2.44, p = 0.13,
η2p = 0.06, revealing no significant difference between YA and
OA (30.40% vs. 24.30%). A main effect of encoding condition,
F(1,33) = 15.68, p = 0.0003, η2p = 0.31, indicated that participants
recollected more self-referenced items than items encoded in the
control condition (32.36% vs. 22.34%). Finally, there was no
significant interaction, F(1,33) < 1 (see Figure 1). Of note, there
were no Guess responses regardless of the group and the condition
and very few Know responses (YA: mean 1.78%± 4.69, OA: mean
0.22%± 0.95, t(33) =−1.52, p = 0.14).
CRS
Figure 2 shows the percentages of CRS by group and encoding
condition.
FIGURE 2 | Mean percentages (and standard deviations) of correctly
recalled sources (CRS) by group and encoding condition (effects of
group and condition,* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, Bonferroni correction).
The analysis revealed a main effect of group, F(1,33) = 9.04,
p = 0.004, η2p = 0.20, showing that OA produced fewer correct
responses than YA (21.34% vs. 31%). There was no effect of
encoding condition, F(1,33) = 2.57, p = 0.12, η2p = 0.06 (self
vs. imagery: 28.38% vs. 23.96%), but a significant interaction
between group and encoding condition, F(1,33) = 5.31, p = 0.02,
η2p = 0.13 (see Figure 2). Subsequent comparisons using Bon-
ferroni post hoc tests showed that for OA, self-reference had
no effect on the percentages of correct responses (20.38% vs.
22.30%, p = 0.96), whereas the difference was significant for YA
(36.37% vs. 25.62%, p = 0.04). Moreover, there was no difference
in performance in the imagery condition (p = 0.86), but the
performance of the YA group was significantly better than that
of the OA group in the self condition (p = 0.001).
fMRI DATA
Encoding
The ANOVA revealed a main effect of condition in a large cluster
encompassing frontal and posterior medial structures, including
the MPFC and the precuneus/PCC. Moreover, lateral parietal
regions and visual areas were activated. Finally, activations in
the left parahippocampal gyrus and hippocampus were reported
(see Figure 3A). All these regions were more activated in the
self condition. The list of local activation maxima is reported in
Table 1. We also report a main effect of group in a fronto-parietal
network encompassing inferior frontal and parietal structures
(see Figure 3B). These regions were more activated in the older
group. The list of local activation maxima is reported in Table 2.
We did not observe any regions showing an interaction between
the two factors.
Regression analyses
Multiple regressions revealed a link between CRS and visual
areas and between CRS and the MPFC (see Figure 4A), for
the coordinates of regions showing correlations with CRS see
Table 3. No correlations were reported for the CRI score. Par-
tial correlations showed that correlations with the visual areas
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FIGURE 3 | Results of the ANOVA with group (young-old) and condition
(self-imagery) as factors. (A) Main effect of condition. All regions were more
activated during self, compared to the imagery condition. (B) Main effect of
group. All regions were more activated in the older, compared to the young
group. Results are superimposed to a single subject rendering and are
significant at a cluster level p(FWE) < 0.05.
Table 1 | Main effect of condition.
Label probable BA k t z MNI coordinates
x y z
L PCC 31 5755 61.93 6.48 −6 −51 24
L MCC 31 57.69 6.31 −12 −42 33
L Mid. Front. Gyrus 8 52.66 6.09 −21 27 36
L Sup. Medial. Front. Gyrus 9 35.34 5.17 0 45 27
L Ang. Gyrus 39 272 46.05 5.77 −45 −69 33
L Parahipp. Gyrus 142 34.88 5.14 −15 −27 −15
L Hipp. 32.53 4.99 −27 −21 −18
R Calcarine Gyrus 17 174 31.72 4.94 12 −93 9
R Cuneus 18 23.83 4.34 12 −90 18
L Superior. Occ. Gyrus 17 20.57 4.06 −12 −93 3
R Ang. Gyrus 39 117 21.85 4.17 51 −66 36
R Inf. Par. Gyrus 39 15.34 3.52 42 −57 36
L = left; R = right; PCC = posterior cingulate cortex; MCC = middle cingulate cortex; Mid. Front. Gyrus = middle frontal gyrus; Sup. Medial. Front. Gyrus = superior
medial frontal gyrus; Ang. Gyrus = angular gyrus; Parahipp. Gyrus = parahippocampal gyrus; Hipp. = hippocampus; Superior. Occ. = superior occipital gyrus; Inf. Par.
Gyrus = inferior parietal gyrus. All reported activations are significant at a cluster threshold of p(FWE) < 0.05.
Table 2 | Main effect of group.
Label probable BA k t Z MNI coordinates
x y z
R Inf. Front. 44 215 24.05 4.36 48 6 12
Gyrus
R Insula 23.45 4.31 33 30 9
R Putamen 19.24 3.93 33 9 6
R Inf. Par. Gyrus 40 201 20.72 4.07 57−36 33
R Inf. Par. Gyrus 40 17.82 3.79 63−30 24
L = left; R = right; Inf. Front. Gyrus = inferior frontal gyrus; Inf. Par. Gyrus = inferior
parietal gyrus. All reported activations are significant at a cluster threshold of
p(FWE) < 0.05.
were no longer significant after controlling for the age of the
subjects, while correlation with the MPFC remained unchanged
(see Figure 4B).
DISCUSSION
Our study aimed to explore the neural correlates of the SRE
via autobiographical memory and their age-related changes. In
particular, for the first time we explored the relationship between
the neural bases of incidental self-referencing encoding via SAM
and qualitative features of subsequent episodic memory in a
group of young and older adults. We found age-related differences
in the effect of SAM compared to general semantic imagery on
subsequent episodic memory retrieval.
At the behavioral level, we showed that the particular self-
referential task tapping SAM is an effective encoding strategy
since it improves memory performance compared to gen-
eral semantic encoding (see Klein et al., 1989; Symons and
Johnson, 1997; Klein, 2012). Very interestingly, we demonstrated
that compared to a control condition that necessitated cogni-
tive processes shared by SAM, such as accessing stored gen-
eral semantic knowledge and mental scene construction, but
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FIGURE 4 | Multiple regressions and mediation analysis. (A) The first
column shows the regions showing a correlation with CRS scores: Cuneus
and MPFC are shown in the upper and lower part of the figure respectively.
Statistical maps are superimposed to an MNI T1 template. Statistical
threshold was set at p < 0.001 (uncorrected) and survived SVC with a
p(FDR) <0.05. The second column shows the graphical representation of the
correlation between the CRS (y-axis) and the Cuneus activation (x-axis), and
the CRS and the MPFC activation (x-axis) respectively on the upper and lower
part of the figure. (B) Mediation analysis showing correlation between visual
areas (Cuneus) and CRS before (green line, r = 0.38, p = 0.02) and after (gray
dotted line, r = 0.24, p = 0.17) removing the effect of age in the upper part of
the figure. In the lower part, the same mediation analysis shows that the
correlation between MPFC and CRS (green line, r = 0.35, p = 0.04) remains
significant after correcting for age (green dotted line, r = 0.35, p = 0.04). Red
arrows represent negative correlations between Cuneus activation and age
(r = −0.39, p = 0.02), and CRS and age (r = −0.49, p = 0.003).
Table 3 | Regression.
Label probable BA k t Z MNI coordinates
x y z
R Cuneus 17 40 5.10 4.33 9 −90 6
R Cuneus 18 4.86 4.17 12 −87 24
L Med. Front. 10 7 4.21 3.72 −6 54 0
Gyrus
L Midd. Occ. 18 13 4.21 3.72 −24 −93 3
Gyrus
L = left; R = right; Med. Front. Gyrus = medial frontal gyrus; Midd.
Occ. Gyrus = middle occipital gyrus. Reported activations are significant at
p(FDR) < 0.05 using a small volume correction (SVC).
with no reference to personal information, the self-referential
encoding still produced a memory improvement. This con-
firms that self-referential processes have particular mnemonic
properties which are more efficient than deep semantic pro-
cessing. This experiment extends previous findings by reveal-
ing the robustness of self-reference on subsequent episodic
memory, even by using incidental encoding and delayed free
recall.
Remarkably, despite the task difficulty (incidental encoding
and free recall), that could have been unfavorable for the elderly,
the SRE seems to be partially preserved in aging. Indeed, our
behavioral results indicate that older adults’ recollection via auto-
noetic consciousness is enhanced for self-referenced information.
This is in line with previous studies showing that the SRE boosts
the ability to remember previous events in a subjective way in
young (Conway and Dewhurst, 1995; Lalanne et al., 2013) as well
as in older adults (Kalenzaga et al., 2012; Kalenzaga and Clarys,
2013; Lalanne et al., 2013). Thus, the self-referential processes that
remain intact in aging are efficient enough to enhance delayed free
recall of (incidentally encoded) items and subjective recollective
experience. Nevertheless, contrary to Hamami et al. (2011) and
Dulas et al. (2011), we failed to show a benefit on source mem-
ory for older adults. Hamami et al. (2011) used very dissimilar
encoding conditions (i.e., self-reference vs. commonness and vs.
structural judgment), and Dulas et al. (2011) used judgments
of pleasantness as a self-reference condition, and commonness
discrimination as a control condition. Thus, it is possible that the
difference in the tasks may explain the difference in results. In our
case, the self-reference and the control condition shared several
key processes (see above). Moreover, we tested detailed source
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memory that referred to recalling the condition of encoding (self
vs. imagery), how the item had been processed (e.g., internally-
generated context such as pressing the button and accessing
personal or impersonal scene imagery). Thus, in accordance with
previous studies (Hashtroudi et al., 1989; Henkel et al., 1998), we
can hypothesize that the similarity between the two experimental
tasks could have made source retrieval more difficult for older
adults. Moreover, binding of perceptual (verbal cue), temporal,
semantic, and affective properties, as well as information about
the cognitive operations that took place at the time of the cue-
based task may explain older adults’ difficulty in retrieving the
encoding context (Johnson et al., 1995).
Probably the most important aspect in explaining our findings
is that we used delayed free recall which is a highly demanding
task, especially for elderly people, while other studies used source
memory after “old-new” recognition. This is in line with some
recent findings showing that compared with alternative encod-
ings, self-reference incidental encoding significantly enhances
delayed memory performance on free recall in young adults but
not in older adults, while it enhances recognition in both popula-
tions (Lalanne et al., 2013). Free recall engages more self-initiated
processes to recover the original encoding situation than recog-
nition, and requires a great amount of cognitive resources which
are deficient in normal aging (Craik, 1986; Naveh-Benjamin and
Old, 2008). Finally, the SRE does not seem sufficient to help
older adults to efficiently use multiple distinctive characteristics
of items and sources in delayed free recall (i.e., what, how and
when sources) (see Ferguson et al., 1992). Overall, our behavioral
results revealed a behavioral dissociation in healthy aging between
autonoetic consciousness, improved by self-referential processing,
and source memory, that does not benefit from self-reference.
At the neural level, the contrast between the self-reference
(SAM) and the control condition showed a similar pattern of
activation in young and older adults. This similarity was further
confirmed by a conjunction analysis testing for convergent acti-
vation across the two groups. We basically reported activations
in the same regions showing a main effect of condition in the
ANOVA, in particular in the MPFC, PCC/precuneus and angular
gyrus (Supplementary Table 1). Activations across the two groups
mainly concerned CMS, namely the network involved in self-
referential processing, such as the MPFC, PCC, MCC, cuneus and
precuneus (Northoff et al., 2006; Denny et al., 2012; Martinelli
et al., 2013c). All these regions have been previously associated
with mentalizing about self-concepts such as goals, beliefs, and
perceptions of oneself (Northoff et al., 2006; Denny et al., 2012).
Hence, we found a pattern of activation quite similar to that
found in young and older adults during a self-referential task
tapping conceptual self-knowledge (Macrae et al., 2004; Gutchess
et al., 2007, 2010; Zhu et al., 2012). Moreover, we confirmed that
the cerebral network devoted to the self is preserved in healthy
aging. No significant difference appeared in this network when
the two age groups were directly compared. We only reported
a greater activation in fronto-parietal areas in older adults, but
independently of the condition. Attentional control is generally
associated with a network of frontal and parietal regions (e.g.,
Kastner and Ungerleider, 2000; Corbetta and Shulman, 2002;
Spreng et al., 2010). As young and older groups performed equally
on SAM and control tasks (see the results from debriefing), over-
recruitment of a fronto-parietal network in the elderly, when
accompanied by similar behavioral performances can be con-
sidered to be compensatory (Cabeza et al., 1997; Reuter-Lorenz
and Cappell, 2008; Campbell et al., 2012). Thus, our findings
demonstrate that activation in the cerebral network responsible
for self-referential processes is comparable between young and
older adults during the incidental encoding of self-referential
information, and suggest that activity in this network boosts the
subsequent recollection.
In order to explore the relationship between the regions
activated by the self vs. imagery contrast at encoding and the
SRE, we conducted regression analyses within the whole pop-
ulation of subjects. Links were noted between source memory
(CRS) and both the MPFC (BA 10) and visual areas during
SAM condition. In other words, the more participants (regard-
less of their age) activated these structures at encoding, the
better their subsequent episodic source memory performance.
The correlation with the activity in the MPFC at encoding is
in line with previous studies underlining its role in success-
ful SRE in episodic memory (Macrae et al., 2004; Zhu et al.,
2012). More specifically, this is consistent with Leshikar and
Duarte (2012) study reporting that the activity of the MPFC
(BA10) at encoding in a self-reference condition is predictive
of source memory accuracy in young adults. In the same vein,
a recent study in young adults found that the SRE on sub-
sequent recognition was associated with greater activity in the
MPFC during the encoding phase (not during the retrieval phase)
(Morel et al., 2014). The present study expands the finding on
the role of this region on the SRE to tasks tapping SAM. This
demonstrates a positive effect of the reactivation of self-related
generic memories on the encoding of new information in episodic
memory.
As far as older adults were concerned, the finding confirms
previous studies indicating that the activity of the MPFC in the
SRE is preserved in healthy aging (Gutchess et al., 2007), thus
seemingly arguing in favor of a preservation of functionality of
this region in older adults. However, the findings also reveal a
correlation between CRS and the activity in the visual areas during
the SAM condition which was mediated by age. The relation-
ship between mental imagery and recollection has already been
emphasized (Dewhurst and Conway, 1994). Donix et al. (2010)
showed a relative age-related increase in the activity of posterior
brain regions when recalling autobiographical memories, and
suggested that it could reflect changes in visuospatial processing
during episodic memory retrieval in older adults. Impairment
in mental imagery in older adults is supported by behavioral
studies that reveal a decline in the generation, maintenance, and
manipulation of mental images (Dror and Kosslyn, 1994; De
Beni et al., 2007; Brewer and Barton, 2012). Moreover, Kalkstein
et al. (2011) established that aging disrupts neural networks that
subserve mental imagery and offered evidence that it is a factor
of age-related memory decline (Palladino and De Beni, 2003).
Thus, it is possible that abilities based on the reactivation of self-
related mental imagery at encoding play a pivotal role in source
memory of self-related items. The very specific aspects of self-
referential processes (MPFC) may not be salient enough in aging,
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requiring over-recruitment of other structures to promote the
SRE on source memory accuracy. Thus, our data suggest a relative
differential functionality of the MPFC in young and older adults,
with a lower specificity in aging in areas related to successful
encoding of self-referenced information. Overall, it may support
the idea of an age-related functional reorganization in the neural
networks underlying self-related long-term memory of new items
(Gutchess et al., 2010).
Nevertheless, further research is needed to substantiate our
findings in aging. Indeed, the absence of the SRE on source mem-
ory in older adults could result from the relatively small sample
size and the experimental design tapping SAM instead of more
abstract self-knowledge. In fact, our experimental self-referencing
task was more difficult than just making judgments about self-
traits. In this line, the over-recruitment of the attentional/fronto-
parietal network in older adults to accomplish the tasks in the
scanner must be considered. Moreover, incidental encoding and
free recall are particularly difficult for the elderly. Future neu-
roimaging research in aging should compare different kinds of
self-referencing processes on the subsequent recall and recogni-
tion of items and source memory, using a large sample size.
In conclusion, the aim of the present study was to test the
effectiveness of self-referencing as a strategy to support episodic
memory encoding in young and older adults using an original
self-reference task tapping generic autobiographical memories.
Our study shows that the regions engaged during self-referential
processing are resilient in the elderly, but highlights age dif-
ferences in the processes related to successful encoding of self-
referenced items. First, though self-referencing improves subjec-
tive recollection in young and older adults, it has an effect on
source memory performance in young adults only. Moreover,
though the activity of the MPFC engaged during self-referential
processing improves the source memory of self-related items
regardless of age, the activity of visual regions also improves the
source memory of self-related items in aging. The present findings
may reveal some differences in the functionalities of the MPFC
regarding the very specific aspects of self-reference on episodic
memory in aging.
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